The primacy effect in the polling booth
When a voter is uncertain between candidates — or simply paying less attention than they intend to — the eye lands at the top of the list and the hand follows. Psychologists call this the primacy effect; electoral administrators call it a problem. Studies of Australian Senate elections, US primary contests and Israeli parliamentary ballots have all found that the first-listed candidate or party gains a measurable share of votes that cannot be explained by anything else. Estimates vary by context, but the boost is real, repeatable and small enough to be invisible in a landslide yet decisive in a close race.
The effect is not simply that voters are lazy. Ballots are often long, the polling booth is unfamiliar, and the act of choosing is cognitively taxing. Under those conditions, the first option acts as an anchor. Down-ballot positions carry a mirror problem: where voters are required to rank or tick multiple choices, the last-listed options are underchosen — a recency drag that is weaker than primacy but present in the data.
Name order within a party list compounds the issue. Proportional systems that allow preferential voting within a list — open lists, as used in the Netherlands and many Scandinavian countries — have documented a strong position premium for the first name on each party's slate. A candidate placed first by the party is not merely signalled as the party's preferred choice; they also harvest the positional bonus. The two effects are impossible to disentangle cleanly, which is itself a design problem.
The standard administrative remedy is rotation: different versions of the ballot print the candidates in a different order, so the advantage is distributed rather than eliminated. Full rotation assigns each candidate the top position in roughly equal numbers of polling districts or precincts. Partial rotation shuffles order within regions. Random draw, used in some US jurisdictions, gives one candidate the primacy bonus for the whole election — it removes human bias in the assignment but does nothing about the structural advantage itself.
Alphabetical ordering, once common, simply transfers the benefit to surnames beginning early in the alphabet — a permanent, invisible gerrymander of a particularly absurd kind. Most administrators have moved away from it. What they have not done is solve the underlying problem: as long as a ballot has a top, something sits there, and that something does better than it should.

The two effects are impossible to disentangle cleanly, which is itself a design problem.

